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The Dynamics of the Hungarian 
Hyperinflation, 1945-6: a New Perspective 
Peter z. Grossman -Janos Horvath* 
Butler University, Indianapolis 
1. Introduction 
From late 1945 through the middle of 1946, Hungary experienced the 
most gigantic inflation of modern history. But in August 1946, the 
astronomical price increases stopped, and lasting price stability followed. 
Indeed, the contrast is so dramatic that it is viewed by some as an economic 
miracle surpassing even the post-war German Wirschaftswunder. 
On the surface, the Hungarian hyperinflation, which witnessed a 
depreciation of the currency unit, the peng<\ of about 10 27 , seems a 
kind of madness that raises two interlinked questions: First, how could 
such a fantastic destruction in the value of a currency take place, and 
second, what possible motive could anyone have for creating this 
inflation or at least for allowing it to happen? 
According to most historians of the inflation, the answer to both 
questions is that Hungary's government used inflation to meet an 
onerous revenue requirement,l and the inflation simply got out of 
• For helpful comments and suggestions the authors wish to thank: Kathy Gjerde, Boh 
Main, and seminar participants at Butler University, Indiana University - Purdue University 
(Indianapolis), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and the International Atlantic 
Economic Society (October 1992). 
I Notahly, B. Nagaro, "Hungary's Recent Monetary Crisis and its Theoretical Meaning", 
American Economic Review, 38 (948), pp. '526-542; W.A. Bomberger and G.E. Makinen, 
"The Hungarian Hyperinflation and Stabilization of 1945-1946", Journal of Political 
Economy, 91 (983), pp. 801-824; and P. Siklos, War Finance, Reconstruction, 
Hvperinflation, and Stabilization in Hungary, 1938-48, (New York 1991). 
405 
Peter Z Grossman ~I(lIluS Horvath 
control. But in this paper, we will show instead that the Hungarian 
government, in which one of us (Horvath) played a role, believing 
high inflation was inevitable, accommodated it and steered it in ways 
to make it an instrument of capacity enhancement. Of course, ultimately 
the huge rates of inflation were beyond control and usefulness. But 
by that time hyperinflation had helped restore the Hungarian economy 
and when that task was achieved, lasting stability became possible. 
This contrasts with the standard story of the inflation, which 
considers the episode a classic case of government ineptitude. It is 
certainly true that the Hungarian government used the inflation for 
other purposes besides capacity enhancement. Hungary did face 
burdensome revenue requirements that it could not easily meet in the 
aftermath of the war. These requirements included $300 million in 
reparation payments, as well as payments in goods, to the occupying 
Soviet army. Altogether government revenues from standard means, 
such as taxes, could provide less than lO percent of the government's 
needs.2 With, initially, an interim government and then a newly elected 
coalition one, officials did not believe that the normal powers of 
taxation and command could be greatly extended. A<; a consequence, 
the government turned to an inflation tax. 
This policy, in turn, spiralled into the most extreme instance of 
hyperinflation of modern times. The cause of this, according to the 
standard history, was the government's attempt to stabilize the value 
of tax revenues by launching a separate currency for the collection 
of taxes, the tax pengo (or TP). But in the process, officials adopted 
a policy by which all tax payments, and, later nearly everything else, 
were indexed to the inflation rate. Paarlherg writes that "the Hungarian 
experience reveals that a wrong signal can open the floodgates that 
lead to chaos. Above all, it illustrates the perils of inept indexation".) 
While it is true that the government sought the means to raise 
revenues, rapid inflation was primari~v seen as a way to reinvigorate 
Hungary's devastated economy, to spark the utilization again of those 
2 Bomberger and Makinen, "Hungarian Hyperinflation." 
'D. Paarlherg, An Ana~vsis and History of Inflation, (Westport, CT 1993), p. 8"i. 
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factors of production that were at the war's end, unemployed. Actually, 
policy makers believed that high inflation was not really a choice at 
all; it was present before the war ended and its continuation was 
inevitable. But they also felt that if it were marshalled correctly, inf1ation 
could help regenerate the economy. And regeneration of productive 
capacity was deemed, for obvious reasons, the best way to meet the 
government's long-run revenue needs. 
Moreover, as we will suggest in this paper, rapid stabilization 
would not have occurred so quickly without the inflation. Because 
of coordination and organizational problems inherently faced by any 
nation emerging from catastrophic destruction (acutely so in the case 
of Hungary), this policy choice of the Hungarian government probably 
had the greatest likelihood of achieving success. 
The specific mechanism the government utilized was to channel 
much of this expansion of the currency into enterprises, both public 
and private, at rates of interest that were effectively (and indeed 
overwhelmingly) negative. It may even be argued that the government 
simply gave money away for reconstruction. Of course, this government 
policy was inevitably unsustainable given the remarkable rates of 
inflation that ensued - which finally reached a daily rate of over 150,000 
percent - but it will be argued that it was also basically successful. The 
Hungarian economy did rebound; people generally accepted the 
rationale behind the inflation; and the Hungarian economy and polity 
were able to emerge from the inflation into a period of relative stability. 
This essay will describe the economic rationale for the policy of 
the Hungarian government, and it will illustrate why the policy was 
to a significant extent, a success. It is not claimed that Hungarian 
authorities conSciously had these models in mind, but it is through a 
basic macroeconomic framework that the implementation and 
outcome of the policy can best be appreCiated. 
2. The Historical Background of Hungary's Hyperinflation 
Although Hungary was a German ally during World War II, it tried, 
with a measure of success until 1944, to remain at some remove from 
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the fighting that was ravaging Europe. As the war neared its end, the 
Hungarian government, led by Admiral Miklos Horthy, could see that 
Germany would lose and it sought to make a separate peace with the 
Allies. The result was not peace. In fact, in 1944, the Germans occupied 
Hungary, forced out Horthy's government, and installed Hungarian 
fascists in power. This turn of events assured that Hungary would play 
a much more active role in the war and that it would face the full force 
of the Soviet Army (and the might of United States air power) as the 
defeat of Germany neared. 
The destruction that ensued was massive. After four years of 
relatively light damage from the war, Hungary became a battle 
ground. Over a period of about six months, from late 1944 through 
early 1945 when the Germans and their Hungarian allies were 
defeated in Hungary by the Red Army, the country was ravaged. 
Half of all industrial capacity was completely destroyed, and an 
estimated 90 percent was damaged. 4 production of key raw materials 
also fell dramatically; coal production fell to about 40 percent, and 
bauxite production to barely one percent, of their pre-war levels 
by the spring of 1945." Transportation could not function. Rail lines 
had been bombed and locomotives that were not destroyed were 
. simply taken by the retreating Nazis and the advancing Russians 
alike. Infrastructure throughout the country was in shambles. All 
of the bridges over the Danube in Budapest were bombed and 
disabled. 
Hungary had witnessed a notable increase in the cost of living 
even before the fighting became severe. Primarily due to the reduced 
availability of consumer goods, the cost of living more than doubled 
from January 1943 to late 1944. However, with the escalation of the 
violence, monetary policy became nearly meaningless. By the time 
the fighting ended, the Hungarian authorities found themselves not 
only scrambling for funds to pay reparations and conduct some 
minimal government functions, they found themselves without an 
'J. Fekete, Back to the Realities: Reflections of a Hungarian Banker, (Budapest 1982). 
'Siklos, War Finance. 
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immediate ability to create money, Retreating Hungarian fascists had 
taken the plates to print currency with them to Germany,6 
By the time one can again sensibly measure the cost of living, 
April 1945, consumer prices had increased about fourteen and a half 
times over the level in late 1944.7 In other words, the new government, 
even before it had the equipment to print money, had inherited a 
hyperinflation. 
Most historians, however, choose to date the start of the 
hyperinflation to later in the summer, when prices began rising steadily 
at 50 percent or more per month, the typical definition of 
hyperinflation. In fact, after the explosion in prices in early 1945, there 
was a lull during which time the price level appears to have been 
relatively stable. But this relative stability in prices did nothing to 
alleviate the problems in the economy, which was still reeling from 
the shock of war. Indeed, stability, which coincided with a nearly 
constant stock of money,S suggests a static (and thus depressed) supply 
of goods. Price stability without an increase in output was undesirable 
and probably not sustainable. In any case, some government officials 
believed that if nothing were done to improve the functioning of the 
economy, economic turmoil would only increase. The supply shock, 
with the destruction of a large portion of the nation's capital stock 
and the inflation that accompanied it, presented the government with 
a problem that temporary price stability could not solve. 
3. The Dynamics of the Hungarian Hyperinflation 
a. Inflation Toward Stabilization 
It was not unique to the Hungarian government and the officials 
of its central bank to believe that accommodating inflation might be 
(, Actually, the currency printing presses did not stop entirely. Money was printed outside 
the country, in Germany and by the Soviet Army. However, money supply figures Cin 
Siklos, War Finance) suggest that on balance, supply was unchanged from early 1945 
until June of that year. 
'Sikhs, op. cit, 
H Ihid. 
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a way to reemploy idled factors of production. Indeed, after World 
War I, German officials defended inflation as a means of restoring 
employment, a position that has been given some theoretical 
underpinnings.9 And in fact, the inflation rate in the three years after 
the war was significantly higher in Germany than it was in Great 
Britain. But in the early 1920s, unemployment was lower in the former. 
Of course, it is important to recognize that the "benefits" of inflation 
to Germany occurred before 1923, before the start of its famous 
hyperinflation. Once inflation careered out of control - almost five 
years after the war ended and after much of Germany's pre-war 
production had been restored - it is clear that the German economy 
deteriorated. Uncertainty about prices, government policy directions, 
and the possible responses of France and Great Britain made German 
entrepreneurs nervous about commitment to future production. 
Investment slowed as entrepreneurs were reluctant to plan ahead. 10 
In 1945 Hungary, circumstances were quite different. As noted above, 
high inflation was already in evidence, the country was in ruins, and 
entrepreneurs had little with which to restart their production lines. 
To understand what kind of environment Hungary faced, consider 
a simple macroeconomic model of aggregate supply and demand. 
The country was, indeed, devastated by the war; estimates are that 
overall at least forty percent of the total stock of capital in Hungary 
was destroyed or disabled. ll This loss of productive capacity, a massive 
supply shock, would, of course, have calamitous macro-effects. 
Assuming a constant stock of money, Hungary should have 
experienced rising prices and depressed output - both of which, as 
noted above, were very much in evidence. 
Such a supply shock should also lead to significant unemployment 
of labour. Assuming a uniform loss of capital across sectors, and an 
elasticity of substitution among factors that was unchanged from the 
,) See. K. Laursen andJ Pedersen, The Germanlnjlatiol1. 1918-1923, (Amsterdam 19(4). 
'0 N. Ferguson, "Constraints and Room for Manoeuvre in the German Inflation of the Early 
1920s", Economic History Reuieu'. 49(996), pp. 635-666 
II Estimates are from Bomberger and Makinen, "Hungarian Hyperintlation," and Fekete. 
Back 10 the Realities. 
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pre-war era, we would get a severe unemployment problem (Figure 
1). Though exact numbers of unemployed are hard to come by, it is 
clear that large segments of the labour force were idle in the months 
after the war. 
The initial supply shock should be regarded as the origin of the 
hyperinflation. Although we think of hyperinflation (if not all inflation) 
as a monetary phenomenon, where the government prints too much 
money, our textbooks remind us that an inflation can occur as well 
from a significant supply disruption, and clearly did in this case; 
indeed, the government could not even print money at first. Whether 
it continues or not will depend on the actions of monetary authorities, 
but the evidence shows that contraction in supply, not expansion of 
money, provided the impetus for the rising price level. 12 
FIGURE 1 • Effect of supply shock on the labour market 
Real Wage 
5 
W1 
W2 
D1 
N2 N1 Employed Labour 
12 Historians have at least noted the importance of the initial shock. For example, Paarlberg 
indicates the importance of 'the dearth of goods' in starting the inflation. But while they 
acknowledge the preexisting problem, they do not recognize the limits on the options 
of the government that that condition created. The issue of an inflationary supply drag 
at a constant money supply is discussed in J. Horvath "A Theory of Institutional Inflation", 
in N. Schmukler and E. Marcus (eds.) Inflation Through the Ages, (New York 1983). 
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Of course, the lost capital, enormous though it was, cannot account 
entirely for the magnitude of inflation. But consider the effects of the 
kind of capital that was lost. For example, the railroads were totally 
disabled; thus, even if goods were produced in one section of the 
country producers could not get those goods to market except at much 
higher prices. Cross-border trade was also at a standstill. Cities such 
as Budapest (from where these price estimates are largely taken), 
were dependent on goods from the Hungarian countryside and from 
abroad, and there were especially large increases in prices for whatever 
goods could be brought in. Moreover, as might be expected in such 
a distressed situation, inflation was aggravated by the rapid conversion 
of money into goods. Effectively then, although the stock of money 
rose by a relatively small percentage, the velocity temporarily increased 
by a large one. 
The Hungarian authorities faced the reality of the shock and the 
subsequent inflationary jump, and they believed that they had two 
basic choices: They could accommodate the inflationary surge or they 
could dampen it. The latter course could have involved contraction of 
the money supply, reduction in government expenditures, increased 
taxation, or some other effort to reduce aggregate demand. Arguably, 
there were already negative demand effects from pessimism and 
demoralization within the country from the very rapid and extensive 
devastation the country had undergone. Any of the policy alternatives 
besides inflation would likely have only deepened pessimism - and 
with it hopes for quick emergence from the catastrophe of the war. Of 
course, to the government these did not seem like plausible options 
in any case. As Kalman Salata of the Smallholders Party noted in a 1946 
parliamentary debate, " ... this inflation ... could only be barred by methocL" 
which would have made it impossible to design a realistic governmental 
budget."13 Given the state of the infrastructure and the fact that the 
government bureaucracy needed to be rebuilt, tax collections were 
seen as too costly by any means other than an inflation tax. 
11 Nemzetgyulesi Napl6 (Parliamentary Records), 25 October 1946, p. un. All translations 
from the parliamentary records are by Janos Horvath. 
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Thus, authorities from the outset believed that their best (and 
perhaps only feasible) alternative was to accommodate the inflation, 
but to utilize it for more that raising revenues. They believed that the 
inflation could be channeled ih such a way as to employ factors of 
production and raise national income. 
The rationale for this policy is straightforward. To extend the 
simple example of aggregate output, rapid money growth is typically 
portrayed as a demand shock that should stimulate consumption and 
so raise quantities supplied. Indeed, a presumption in high inflation 
is that there is little point in holding money and so it is rapidly 
converted into goods, and, in turn, existing capital is utilized more 
fully. 
However, in this case, a consumer demand stimulus would be 
insufficient unless there was also renewed investment to restore a 
significant level of productive capacity to pre-devastation levels. 
Hungarian authorities felt that inflation could also be utilized to 
stimulate investment and increase employment far more than a 
demand stimulus could be expected to induce. Put another way, 
while money growth is typically considered a stimulus to aggregate 
demand through consumption, the Hungarian policy was thought 
to be a way to shift the aggregate supply curve most of all. This 
meant using high inflation in some way to affect the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs (rather than consumers) to invest money in productive 
activities. 
BaSically, there are two channels by which this can be effected. 
Inflation, if it is not fully indexed, can be used either to lower the real 
cost of capital or to lower the real wage. Either is possible only if the 
suppliers of capital and/or labour acquiesce to a reduction in their 
real returns and it is generally thought in the literature that this will 
be unlikely. But in fact, Hungarian authorities managed, at least 
indirectly, to do both. 
In theory, there should be no difference in policy makers' 
ability to affect real costs with or without inflation. If expectations 
are rational, suppliers of factors should adjust to the inflation, 
making any inflationary component moot. If, indeed, the returns 
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are, in real terms, too high (for some reason) then these should 
adjust downward - lower real rates of interest in the capital 
markets and lower real wages in the labour market - as suppliers 
gain information on the true state of their respective markets, 
making inflation unnecessary. In fact, since high inflation is 
disruptive (hence costly) to an economy, it may seem preferable 
for policymakers to do their utmost to contain inflation and let 
markets take their course. 
However, for there to be wage restraint and low interest rates, 
there has to be a set of credible policies and an authority able to 
coordinate them. In Hungary's case, it does not seem that this state 
of affairs obtained. Indeed, the government was unable to articulate 
a credible policy on curbing inflation because it seemed apparent, 
without a clear ability to command sufficient revenues, it would have 
to resort to money printing. But at the same time, the authorities were 
able to use inflation to effect reductions in real capital costs and wages 
- increasing the demand for capital and labour - which in real terms 
as of mid-194S were probably too high. These reductions could not 
have been effective, and were perhaps not even possible, through 
any alternative policies. 
b. The Cost of Capital 
Consider a simple model of an economy where the demand for 
capital is a function of output and real interest rates, or K = fey, r), and 
entrepreneurs invest to the point where the value of output from new 
capital must equal the user cost. That is, the marginal value product 
of capital (P *y /K) will equal the marginal cost of an additional unit 
of capital. The user cost will include the purchase price, the real interest 
rate, disruption costs and so on. 
If a firm can realize an increased output price, even though it may 
be assumed that the marginal product of additional capital falls, there 
would still be incentives for greater investment if the user cost does 
not rise as rapidly. In normal times, it may be assumed that if there is 
rapid inflation, although the price of output rises, user costs will grow 
as well; indeed as inflation becomes very rapid, the rental cost would 
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include an ever rising interest premium to cover expected inflation. 
With all other factors rising in price at least as much as the inflation 
rate, there will be at best no increase in capital demand; more likely 
demand will fall. 
Moreover, capital markets tend to function badly if at all, in a 
hyperinflation. Of course, high inflation will encourage borrowers; 
debtors benefit disproportionately because they can payoff loans 
with easy money. But typically, in hyperinflation, investment is reduced 
because no creditors will make loans - or if they will, they do so only 
at enormous rates of interest to insure a positive real return, raising 
user costs not lowering them. Instead of an expansion of capital there 
is a contraction. In the case of an economy with an already shrunken 
capital base, this would seem to lead to further deterioration of 
conditions not reconstruction. 
But government does have potentially the means of lowering user 
costs. First, it can, through its fiscal policy, subsidize entrepreneurs 
directly to acquire capital. Then, regardless of the price of other factors, 
the effective cost to entrepreneurs falls. 
Second, government is able to influence nominal rates of interest, 
and any subsequent inflation adjustments. That is, the terms of loans 
from the central bank will set the conditions under which a nation's 
banks may borrow. Market rates will emerge based on central bank 
rules and behaviour. Banks may require a return on their own cost of 
funds, but, if central bank rates are set low enough, the real cost of 
borrowing may be kept low enough to continue to encourage bank 
participation. 
Although outright government giveaways might be a clearer path 
to capital restoration, it also might be less efficient than by using 
bankers. Since banks specialize in knowing the creditworthiness 
and long-term prospects of potential borrowers, the government, 
by using the banks, was effectively lowering transactions costs and 
getting money to entrepreneurs in proportions that would reflect 
their general creditworthiness and ability to contribute to a 
reconstruction. Bankers, more than government bureaucrats, would 
have better knowledge of which entrepreneurs in the community 
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were most likely to use the funds efficiently to effect capital 
restoration. 
Of course, the central bank needed to overcome the reluctance 
of lenders to lend under hyperinflation as well as provide a means to 
keep real interest rates low enough to encourage borrowing. Indeed, 
the authorities sought a method to use the banks to essentially engineer 
a wealth transfer to entrepreneurs - but one in which the banks also 
realized a profit. 
The most obvious way would be to set nominal rates at a level 
that would lead to a real interest rate that was effectively negative. 
Note the importance of the inflation channel here. If the authorities 
wanted to encourage entrepreneurs to borrow, a negative interest 
rate is a strong incentive. Of course, one never sees a negative nominal 
rate, and so a negative real rate depends on inflation. A bank might 
agree to lend at a negative real rate provided it could realize a 
significant enough spread over its own borrowing rate. In other words, 
through inflation, the central bank can get real resources into the 
hands of entrepreneurs through banks, using the bankers' expertise, 
and also compensate the bank for the transaction. With increased 
lending, this guarantees a soaring money supply, but presumably this 
is a temporary expedient; through it, the government achieves its goal 
of lowering the cost of capital and creating incentives of economic 
restoration. 
In the Hungarian case, the authorities used both banks and direct 
subsidies, but in all instances, for all practical purposes, they gave 
money away to those able to influence the means of production. State 
enterprises received grants outright. A quarter or more of Hungarian 
government expenditures went toward the financing of state 
enterprises. Moreover, through the short-lived Ministry of 
Reconstruction, thousands of unemployed workers were hired directly 
to restore infrastructure and bring in the harvest. 
Private business also received fund" - ostensibly as loans - directly 
from the government. Just how much they received is unclear. But 
the evidence suggests that the loans were substantial. Paal, in her 
work on the stabilization period, has noted the unusual and important 
416 
The Dynamics afthe Hungarian Hyperinflation, 1945-6: a New Perspective 
involvement of the government during this entire period in private 
credit markets. l4 Indeed, loans were extended both through the 
Hungarian National Bank and through the Ministry of Reconstruction. 
And as Siklos points out, the government had no expectation of these 
"loans" ever being repaid,l> although, given the rate of money creation, 
repayment of principal did not have much meaning unless loans were 
fully indexed to the cost of living, which they were not. 
The terms were quite favourable to say the least. Loans were 
adjusted for inflation, but as the accompanying figure (Figure 2) shows, 
the escalator was conSistently behind the rate of change in the cost 
of living. Moreover, the escalator continued to lag behind cost of living 
increases even when indexation brought other aspects of economic 
life (including TP denominated deposits) in line with cost of living 
changes. 
FIGURE 2 - Percent Difference Interest Rate Escalator to Inflation 
0,25.---------------------------------------------------, 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
o 
-0.05 
-0.1 
-0.15 
-0.2 
-0.25 
-0.3 .L-________________________________________________ ----' 
-- Percent Difference Escalator to Inflation 
Source: Siklos (1991) 
), B. Paal, "Destabilizing Effects of a Successful Stabilization: A Forward-Looking 
Explanation of the second Hungarian Hyperinflation", manuscript, (1998), Cornell 
University. 
"Siklos, op. cit. 
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But the Hungarian government also utilized the banking system 
throughout the country to provide a source of funds for entrepreneurs. 
The government and central bank,16 to encourage bank participation 
in this effort, essentially paid banks to take money - albeit depreciating 
money - and, in turn, put it in the hands of producers. The central 
bank's discount rate throughout the period was a constant (and in 
light of the magnitude of the inflation, absurd) three percent, 17 which 
meant that in an environment where inflation rates were reaching 
thousands of percent per day real rates of interest were grotesquely 
negative. IS Banks could therefore receive a negative return from 
borrowers - viz it viz the inflation rate - and be effectively subsidized 
July 1945 
August 1945 
September 1945 
October 1945 
November 1945 
December 1945" 
January 1946 
February 1946 
March 1946 
April 1946 
May 1946 
June 1946 
July 1946 
TABLE 1. Bank Notes in Circulation 
End of month 
25,433,900.000 
35.521.100.000 
51.034.100.000 
115.961.100.000 
364.592.000.000 
765,446.300.000 
1.646,450.000.000 
5.237.808.300.000 
34.001.636)300.000 
434.304.091.200.000 
. 65.588.977.992.200.000 
6.277 .271.200.000.000.000.000 
47.300.000.000.000.000.000.000.000 
Adapted from Siklos 1991 and Nagaro 1948 
16 Note that the Hungarian central hank was, prior to the World War II, an independent 
entity, and in fact was harred from granting direct credit to the government. This rule 
was suspended before the start of the war so that the government could direct credit 
creation from the bank. Moreover, in 1946, the government temporarily took direct 
control of the bank through a commissioner whose role was to ensure among other tasks, 
that the bank acted in ways supportive of "the general interests of the country," quoted 
in Bomberger and Makinen, "The Hungarian Hyperintlation", footnote 9. 
e See, Bomberger and Makinen, op. cit. 
1< Scc Paarlherg, op. cit. It should be noted that Siklos has argued the central bank applied 
a discount rate on the deposits of banks, and so effectively the nominal rate was well 
abovl' 3 perccnt. HO\vever, cI'cn \\lith the additional ratc, the real rate \vas still negativl' 
to a Significant extent. 
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by the government in the process. It would be anticipated that under 
such a regime, money creation would be tremendous, and this was 
clearly the case as Table 1 shows. 
There is one question that must inevitably arise at this point: why 
did the banks not take the money given to them by the government 
and turn it into real goods instead of loaning it out at a depreciating 
rate of return? There are several reasons why this did not occur. Of 
course, there undoubtedly was some profiteering, but bankers were 
constrained by three factors. First, the Hungarian banking community 
was small and rather clubby; it was dominated by four large banks. 19 
Thus, the banking sector was fairly easily monitored and since the 
central bank conditioned further loans on the behaviour of the banks 
- that is, whether they used the funds to further government policy 
of restoring production - banks could have jeopardized their ability 
to continue in business and to have profiteered themselves. 
Second, Hungarian banks, like their German counterparts, had 
close relationships (including equity participation) with the companies 
they loaned to. Consequently, the banks themselves benefited from 
the wealth transfers. Further, as equity owners, banks had a direct 
interest in firms' long-term prospects, which presumably would be 
enhanced more by capital expansion than by commodity profiteering. 
Finally, there was altruism. While this is hard to quantify, it has 
been noted by historians and by contemporary observers that in 
devastated regions of Europe in the aftermath of the war, people 
pulled together out of a sense of duty to get their country back to 
normal. This was especially evident in countries like Hungary with 
primarily a single ethnic group and shared cultural values. Bankers, 
like others in the community, were willing to sacrifice short-term profit 
potential for the longer-term goal of economic growth and stability. 
c. The Cost of Labour 
The inflation that the government encouraged also increased 
employment. Theoretically, this is possible but unlikely in most 
,<) Fekete, Back to the Realities. 
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circumstances. As inflation erodes the real wage, (assuming no or 
incomplete indexation), employers have an incentive to hire more 
labour. Indeed, as the real wage continues to fall, there would be an 
incentive for firms to substitute labour for capital, and return 
unemployed labour to the workforce. Although the marginal product 
of additional labour may be low, each worker adds to overall 
productive gains for the economy. Falling wages will continue to 
encourage firms to hire more workers as long as labourers are willing 
to accept what they are offered. 
Though such a policy can be supported from a theoretical 
perspective, it is inevitably limited in its application. Workers will not 
accept drastically falling real wages as a rule. Moreover, workers will 
generally not assent to policies that expliCitly engineer a wealth transfer 
from themselves to producers. Yet in the Hungarian case the 
government was effectively taxing resources away from workers (and 
farmers and shopkeepers) to give to the entrepreneurs. 
It seems clear that such a wealth transfer must have a willing 
populace. It is highly doubtful that in most democratic settings, a 
policy that transfers wealth from the majority of citizens to a few 
that are generally better off to begin with could be implemented or 
at least not on a wide scale. (Indeed, it seems likely that part of the 
reason for indexation of some banks deposits in Hungary, beginning 
in 1946, was to ameliorate what was otherwise a vast transfer of the 
nation's resources. Even in the Hungarian case, it was not 
sustainable.) 
But in the meantime, real wages fell steadily, and dramatically. As 
the index in Figure 3 suggests the real wage declined by more than 
85 per cent in the first seven months of 1946 alone. It should be noted 
that this figure somewhat overstates the real wage loss. This figure 
represents the loss in the money wage, but workers often received in 
kind payments of food or other conunodities. Still, there is every reason 
to believe that the losses suffered by workers were massive. Even if 
various commodity payments made up 50 percent of the losses -
which is almost certainly too high - the wealth transfer would still be 
large. As Hungarian finance minister Jena Riez told parliament in 
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FIGURE 3 - Index of Real Wages July 1945 - June 1946 
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1946, during the period of inflation people had acquiesced in 
"exceptionally low living standards."20 
There is no doubt that this kind of transfer would be hard to achieve 
in other contexts. For example, in a developing country today, workers 
would be unlikely to accept such a huge loss in their real wages and, 
indeed, one would expect that any attempt to lower real wages by 
even 25 percent would spark social unrest. Hungarian workers did not 
rebel, nor did they leave the work force. Yet, as a temporary state of 
affairs, this is not so surprising. What was the average Hungarian 
worker's opportunity cost in early 1946? With the country devastated, 
arguably the alternative was something close to starvation and longer-
term deprivation. With such a low opportunity cost, there were few 
incentives to engage in protest activities that could only slow recovery. 
There is reason to believe that the devastation and supply shock 
of 1944-5 led to a major shift in the labour supply curve. Given falling 
opportunity costs and diminished expectations, the supply curve 
20 Nemzetgyulesi Nap/6, 25 October 1946, p.181. 
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FIGURE 4 - A shift in the labour supply curve 
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would be likely to become horizontal at a very low wage. Thus as 
Figure 4 suggests, even with a drastic shrinkage of the capital stock, 
and a substantial increase in unemployment (Figure 1), the altered 
supply curve leads to a low market clearing real wage (W2) and a 
markedly larger number of employed - even before any restoration 
in the capital stock, and shift in the demand curve for labour. 21 
However, for the level of employment to advance beyond N2, labour 
demand would finally have to shift to the right. 
Of course, the preceding analysis does raise the question: why 
bother with inflation? If workers accept a lower real wage in principle, 
then they should be indifferent between stable prices and a reduced 
nominal wage and a stable nominal wage and increased prices. In 
21 Indeed, anecdotally, there is much evidence that people were re-employed in industries 
where the capital stock was destroyed, and low productivity resulted. Finance Minister 
Racz noted, dramatically, how "millions of peasants ... harnessed themselves before the 
plough," while "industrial workers [returned to factories that were] burnt ruins ... " 
Nemzetgyr'i!esi Napl6, 10 December 1946, p. 384. Under these circumstances, the marginal 
product of labour would be low, and wages fell accordingly. 
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theory, no doubt this is true. But in order for the government to effect 
this, there must be credibility on the part of government policy-makers 
that they will not promote inflation, and that they have the ability to 
coordinate all segments of the economy toward that end. Even if the 
government had wanted to do so, it is exceedingly doubtful (as noted 
earlier) that, under the particular circumstances of post-war Hungary, 
anyone could have credibly delivered a "no inflation" pledge. There 
was not only concern within the population at large about the 
authority's ability to conduct both fiscal and monetary policy but also 
lingering fears of additional supply shocks due to uncertain conditions 
where Hungary's soil was still occupied by the Red Army. 
Consequently, more inflation became highly probable (although 
of uncertain magnitude) and would have been rationally anticipated. 
More important, in such circumstances, workers will generally figure 
that they will do better to accept erosion of their real wage through 
inflation than to agree to a nominal wage cut. That is, given conditions 
of uncertainty, nominal wage stickiness may well be the result of 
rational calculation. 
Consider a case where workers can accept a 50 percent nominal 
wage cut or endure one from an expected increase in the price level 
of 100 percent. If both can be delivered with certainty, the worker 
should be indifferent between the outcomes (although given the 
disruption of high inflation a worker may well be more inclined to 
prefer the former) But now introduce a high degree of uncertainty 
in the government's ability to deliver on its inflation rate pledge. If 
there is any inflation in the first case, workers lose more than 50 
percent of their real wage, and in most scenarios workers do worse 
than if they had accepted inflation, For example, if the inflation rate 
turns out to be less than 100 percent, workers will do worse to accept 
a nominal wage cut than a rigid nominal wage with inflation. If the 
rate is greater than 100 percent, the outcome depends on whether the 
inflation rate turns out to be much higher if the government 
accommodates inflation than if it makes a non-credible commitment 
to resist it. So if workers take a nominal pay cut of 50 percent and 
int1ation turns out to he 50 percent, that would produce the same real 
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wage as a rigid nominal wage and a 200 percent inflation rate. Since 
high inflation appeared likely (and, indeed, had appeared earlier in 
the year) and given that it was unlikely that the authorities (even if 
they had wanted to) could deliver anything close to price stability, 
workers probably preferred inflation as the means to drive down the 
real wage. 
Moreover, Hungarian workers were actually receiving a nominal 
pay increase - only an increase that lagged behind the inflation rate. 
This way they could experience a real-wage erosion over time; if real 
wages fell too low, too fast, workers could demand a nominal wage 
increase to brake it. It might be argued that Hungarian workers 
engaged in an ongoing implicit contracting process, whereby they re-
evaluated their wages daily given information on inflation and on 
their perceptions of their opportunity costs. Note that in Figure 3 real 
wages do not fall steadily. Although they fall lower on trend, they 
move upward on a couple of occasions. Presumably the rate of 
decrease in real wages had been too steep in the previous period and 
workers demanded a scaling up to recoup some of their losses. 
However in the longer term, wages did fall on trend, and we can 
infer the value of the opportunity costs in the few months before 
stabilization in August 1946. In the spring of 1946, there appeared the 
so-called "calorie" wage, by which workers were paid in money and 
in-kind enough to permit basic subsistence. 22 The wage varied by type 
of employment (manual labourers had a higher calorie wage than 
white collar workers) and by family size. However, that this wage was 
generally accepted suggests that the average worker's opportunity 
cost was finally, by the end of the hyperinflation, at or below 
subsistence. As was noted in Parliament, "[A] great many very basic 
and urgent necessities had to be given up while the meeting of these 
needs was postponed into the distant future ... " 2, 
Admittedly, this kind of assault on wages could not continue 
indefinitely even in a devastated country such as post-war Hungary. 
22 Discussed in Siklos, op. cit. 
2\ Jena Racz, Nemzetgyul!?si Nap/6, 25 October 1946, p.1S1. 
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There needed to be a promise of stabilization in the foreseeable future. 
The Hungarian government - after November 1945, an elected regime 
- promised just that: eventual stabilization and an end to hyperinflation. 
Indeed, it was observed that the "population sensed the determination 
and commitment that motivated the government to give [eventually] 
a firm and stable money to the country."2", Thus, hyperinflation was 
deemed a temporary sacrifice for the good of the nation and, even as 
it continued, officials could point to gains that were being made. As 
a result, at least for several months, workers endured a severe 
deterioration in their wages and their wealth. 
Overall, inflation served two goals for the Hungarian government. 
It was, first, a means of taxation to acquire resources; but, second, it 
proved a means - indeed was the principal means - for Hungarian 
reconstruction. 
3. Analysis and Conclusions 
There have been several analyses of the end of the hyperinflation 
and subsequent stabilization. 20 These explain how a regime change 
was instituted and stability in the monetary system was restored. Credit 
is given to credible government policies along with the return of 
Hungary's gold supply, which had been removed by the retreating 
Nazis. 
But, as we have argued, this hyperinflation had a goal beyond 
stabilization. It was a conscious effort at economic restoration and 
revitalization. In that case, the appropriate measure of success or 
failure is the state of the Hungarian economy in August 1946 when 
the new regime (and currency, the forint) was implemented. 
2; Kilman Salata Nenzzetgyulesi Napl6, 2':; October 1946, p. 181. 
lS See P. Siklos, "The End of the Hungarian Hyperinflation of 1945-4", Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 21 (1989), pp. 132-47, as well as Paal "Destabilizing" and Bomberger 
and Makinen, "The Hungarian Hyperinflation". Cagan treats the Hungarian case in his 
classic, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation", in M. Friedman (ed.) Studies ill the 
Quantity Theory of Money, (Chicago 19.:;6). As others have pointed out, however, his 
analysis suffers in the Hungarian case from the fact that he did not have accurate data. 
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In fact, the Hungarian economy went far in only one year. As 
Figure 5 shows, production in manufacturing increased substantially. 
FIGURE 5 - Manufacturing Index 
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At the same time, infrastructure - especially the railroads - was largely 
restored, and raw materials production was renewed. Indeed, given 
that the series for the manufacturing index begins only in January 
1946, the graph clearly understates the recovery of the manufacturing 
sector. Fekete26 reports that iron and metal industries were at 75 
percent, and railroads at 90 percent, of their prewar level by August 
1946. 
Because Hungary faced such massive devastation, it must have 
seemed unlikely in early 1945 that Hungary could restore its productive 
capacity quickly. But it clearly did while other devastated regions did 
not. Germany, for example, was not close to its pre-war level of 
productivity one year after the war's end, but Hungary was. 
2<, Fekete, Back to the Realities. 
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Siklos has argued that the extremes of the hyperinflation imposed 
longer-term costs despite the relatively painless transition to stability 
that the government managed to effect in August 1946. 27 That may 
well be true. So tremendous an inflation is unlikely to be undertaken 
and ended costlessly, and there were costs to Hungary's hyperinflation. 
But on the terms set by the Hungarian government - where the 
restoration of production was the overriding goal - the policy of 
inflation must be accounted an overall success. 
Of course, this success is at least partly attributable to the special 
circumstances of Hungary's predicament. The low opportunity costs 
of workers, the lack of a functioning capital market, the credibility of 
government pledges of eventual stability are among factors that might 
have been particularly relevant in the Hungarian case. The nature of 
Hungarian society and its cultural institutions might also have played 
a part, though this is a matter for another study. But the case remains 
important in its own right as an example of how even the most unlikely 
economic forces might be turned to benefit a nation at a time and 
place where few "normal" options seem to exist. 
2- Siklos, ''The End of the Hungarian Hyperint1ation.'· 
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